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Legal Ethics
by L. Ray Patterson*
and

William P. Smith, III**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two events of particular importance to Georgia lawyers occurred
during the survey period. First, the Supreme Court of Georgia adopted
The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct on June 12, 2000 to become
effective January 1, 2001. The basis for the new rules is the American
Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted
by the ABA in 1983 to supersede the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. The new code will replace both the Georgia Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Standards of the State Bar Rules.
Second, the American Law Institute adopted the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers ("Restatement"). While the Restatement will not be
binding on lawyers, it undoubtedly will be a document of immense
influence on courts and lawyers. It is the first document in which
lawyer's law has been collected and integrated as a separate body of law.
Georgia lawyers would be well advised to familiarize themselves with
the Restatement.
II.

LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES

The term "legal ethics" has a long history in American jurisprudence,'
but as the Restatement proves, it is in the process of being superseded
by the more meaningful term "lawyer's law." The difference in
terminology can make a difference in the perspective of lawyers and
* Pope Brock Professor of Law, University of Georgia. Mercer University (A.B., 1949);
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (LL.B., 1957).
** General Counsel, State Bar of Georgia. Emory University (B.A.); Emory University
School of Law (LL.B.).
1. The term dates back at least to the Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar
Association adopted in 1887. See 118 Ala. XXIII-XXXIV (1899).
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courts. Most lawyers and judges view legal ethics as governing the
lawyer's duties to, and relationship with, the client. The term "lawyer's
law" recognizes that the lawyer has duties to others as well. Thus, it is
interesting to note that in regard to one case, Bowen v. Hunter,Maclean,
Exley & Dunn,2 had the Georgia Court of Appeals followed the Restatement, it would almost surely have reached a different result as to the
liability of the lawyer defendant to third parties.
The relevant section of the Restatement is as follows:
§ 73. Duty of Care to Certain Non-Clients
For purpose of liability under § 71, a lawyer owes a duty to use care
within the meaning of § 74:
(4) to a non-client when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer's client is a trustee, guardian, executor, or fiduciary
acting primarily to perform similar functions for the non-client;
(b) circumstances known to the lawyer make it clear that appropriate
action by the lawyer is necessary with respect to a matter within the
scope of the representation to prevent or rectify the breach of a
fiduciary duty owed by the client to the non-client, where (i) the breach
is a crime or fraud or (ii) the lawyer has assisted or is assisting the
breach;
(c) the non-client is not reasonably able to protect its rights; and
(d) such a duty would not significantly impair the performance of the
lawyer's obligations to the client?
Note the Restatement provides that a lawyer owes a duty of care when
the client is an administratrix and the lawyer knows appropriate action
is necessary to prevent or rectify the breach of a fiduciary duty the client
owes to the nonclient when the breach is a fraud or the lawyer assists
in the breach.4 This circumstance is essentially the fact pattern in
Bowen.?
Plaintiffs were the mother and sister of an intestate decedent, and the
lawyer represented the decedent's widow, who was the administratrix of
the estate. The widow had signed a prenuptial agreement that barred
her from inheriting any portion of her husband's estate. The mother and
sister asked the widow's lawyer if there was a prenuptial agreement.
The lawyer acknowledged there was "such a contract (he did not draft

2. 241 Ga. App. 204, 525 S.E.2d 744 (1999).
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS
8, 1997).
4. RESTATEMENT § 73(4)(a)-(b).

5. 241 Ga. App. at 204-08, 525 S.E.2d at 746-49.
6. Id. at 204-05, 525 S.E.2d at 746-47.

§

73 (Tentative Draft No.
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it), but could not deliver a copy to them without his client's permission,
which [she] declined to give."7 In an earlier stage of the proceedings,
the trial court had ruled the mother and sister had standing to enforce
the prenuptial agreement.' The Georgia Supreme Court dffirmed the
ruling in Sieg v. Sieg.9 The parties eventually settled that case, and
nine months later, the mother and sister sued the lawyer and his law
firm for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court
bifurcated the trial, separating the issue of the validity of the agreement
from the liability of the lawyer. The jury determined the prenuptial
agreement was invalid, and the court granted summary judgment to
defendants on the breach of fiduciary duty claim.1
The trial court relied on the fact that "Georgia has not addressed the
issue of whether the attorney of a fiduciary-such as the administrator
of an estate-owes a fiduciary duty in turn to heirs at law"11 and
concluded there was no fiduciary or confidential relationship between
plaintiffs and the lawyer.' 2 The duty a lawyer owes to a client and the
fiduciary relationship a client maintains with a nonclient, however, are
two different issues, as the four conditions of Restatement section 73(4)
make clear. The client was an administratrix; appropriate action by the
lawyer was necessary to rectify the breach of a fiduciary duty owed by
the client; the nonclient was not reasonably able to protect its rights;
and the duty did not impair the performance of the lawyer's obligation
to the client unless the lawyer was to act as a shield for the client's
13
conduct if inconsistent with her obligations as administratrix.
As indicated in Restatement section 73(4)(b), the basic issue in Bowen
was not the lawyer's duty but instead the widow's duty as administratrix. Did she have a duty to show the agreement to the mother and
sister, and was there a duty to reveal the agreement to the probate
court? The court of appeals made no mention of this point. Presumably,
the administratix did owe a duty to the probate court to provide it with
all relevant documents, and the document in issue was clearly relevant
to the administration of the estate. Had the agreement been filed with
the court, it probably would have been a matter of public record
available to the mother and sister.

7. Id. at 205, 525 S.E.2d at 747.
8. Id.
9. 265 Ga. 384, 386, 455 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1995).
10. 241 Ga. App. at 205, 525 S.E.2d at 747-48.
11. Id. at 206, 525 S.E.2d at 748.
12. Id. at 206-07, 525 S.E.2d at 748-49.
13. Id.

326

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

Bowen is, thus, a classic example of faulty analysis. The issue was not
the lawyer's duty but the client's duty. Consider the widow's duty as a
widow and as an administratrix. As widow she presumably had no legal
duty to show the mother and sister the agreement; as administratrix she
clearly did. The point the court overlooked is that the lawyer was
representing the widow as administratrix, and the lawyer's duty in
acting for a client is determined by the client's duty. This duty follows
from the fact that the client is the principal and the lawyer is the agent:
The principal's duty determines the agent's duty. Lawyers selectively
use this idea, and seldom is it articulated. Indeed, the lawyer used it in
Bowen when he said he could not deliver the document without the
client's permission. Thus, he relied on the client's decision not to deliver
the contract as the reason for not delivering it himself. 4
However, another proposition about the nature of the client is
relevant. There are two kinds of clients: a client in an individual
capacity and a client in a representative capacity. Here, the widow as
administratrix was a client in a representative capacity, but the lawyer
treated her as a client in an individual or personal capacity. Presumably this was because the legal culture emphasizes the duty of loyalty
to the client above all else due to the influence of codes of ethics. These
codes emphasize the lawyer's duties to the client: the duty of competence, the duty of communication (keeping the client informed), the duty
to avoid conflicts of interest, and the duty of confidentiality. These
duties correlate to the client's rights. But the lawyer also acts for the
client in relation to others, and the source of these duties is the client's
duties. The client's duties, in turn, are determined by the law, and
insofar as the lawyer is concerned, they are derivative duties. Thus,
because the widow as administratrix had a duty to the potential heirs,
the lawyer also had that duty.
This analysis explains the Restatement provision quoted above, and
it is unfortunate that the ruling in Bowen is contrary to that provision.
There is, however, another reason to regret the case. It sends the wrong
message to lawyers, which is that the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the
client gives the lawyer license to serve as the client's agent in disregarding both the law and the client's duty to the court.
III.

THE DUTY TO THE COURT

The court in Bowen did not apply the proposition that the client's
duties determine the lawyer's duties when the lawyer acts for the client.
The same court, however, applied this proposition in another case,

14.

Id. at 205, 525 S.E.2d at 747.
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although under a different rule, which concerned the duty to inform the
court of adverse authority. Georgia Receivables, Inc. v. Kirk" involved
an assignee of a health spa contract who brought an action to enforce the
contract. The trial court granted defendant summary judgment under
the applicable statute in accord with three decisions involving the same
plaintiff. 16 In the words of the court: "With regard to the matter at
hand, the same issues which were dispositive herein were raised by the
same attorneys [for the same plaintiff] in the same manner in at least
three appeals previously decided by this Court," all of which were
decided adversely to plaintiff. 7
The court denied plaintiff's motion to withdraw the appeal and
considered whether it should impose sanctions for a frivolous appeal
against plaintiff and its counsel." Because of the motion to dismiss,
the court decided not to impose penalties, but it took "[the] opportunity
to remind counsel of their obligations to supplement the pleadings before
this Court upon receipt of notice of legal authority directly adverse to
their position or to withdraw their appeal."' 9 The court also noted the
lawyers violated several other rules by making arguments that were
without merit and by breaching their duty to the court to give "notice of
the pendency of the several cases involving the same issue, the same
appellant, and the same attorney at the time they filed the later
appeals." ° Even so, the court concluded that "Georgia Receivables has
now met its professional obligations and moved to correct its deficiencies,
however, and, therefore, we no longer deem a penalty warranted."2'
When the violated rules are analyzed, they reflect the fundamental
proposition that the client's rights and duties determine the lawyer's
rights and duties in acting for the client. Thus, the lawyer had no right
to file the appeal, to make frivolous arguments, and to fail to inform the
court of related pending cases because his client, Georgia Receivables,
as principal had no right to do so. Therefore, Georgia Receivables could
not give the lawyer as its agent the authority to do so. The court
recognized this point when it said the corrective action was that of the
client, not the lawyer: "Georgia Receivables has now met its professional
obligations and moved to correct its deficiencies,

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

242 Ga. App. 801, 531 S.E.2d 393 (2000).
Id. at 801-03, 531 S.E.2d at 394-96.
Id. at 803, 531 S.E.2d at 395.
Id. at 801, 803, 531 S.E.2d at 395-96.
Id. at 802, 531 S.E.2d at 395.
Id. at 803, 531 S.E.2d at 396.
Id.

...

and ...

we no
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longer deem a penalty warranted."22 Why would the court exonerate
the client unless it was the client's duty, acting through the lawyer, to
fulfill the obligations?
This decision again sends the wrong message to the bar. It suggests
lawyers can take chances, ignore the rules, and avoid the penalty by
recanting if caught. The basic point is that courts are ultimately
responsible for the unethical conduct of lawyers for one simple reason:
If the courts imposed sanctions for this conduct, lawyers would not
engage in it.
IV. MALPRACTICE

In Szurovy v. Olderman,23 plaintiff sued the lawyer who represented
her in a divorce action for malpractice, alleging the lawyer failed to
negotiate an award of alimony and failed to preserve her right to seek
future alimony. The parties entered into a settlement that did not
provide for alimony, and plaintiff testified she did not realize she waived
her alimony rights by agreeing to the settlement. The trial court
granted summary judgment for defendant lawyer.24 The court of
appeals affirmed on the grounds that plaintiff failed to establish
damages and proximate cause.25 The court noted that.the husband
owed $13,000 for child support, that the husband's lawyer insisted he
would not pay alimony, and that to satisfy the burden of proof on
summary judgment, defendant was required to point out by reference to
the record an absence of proof by the wife on the issue of proximate
27
cause.26 The court concluded defendant had fulfilled his burden.
The court's ruling is consistent with tort law, but it should be noted
that proximate cause, a nebulous concept at best, can be viewed as an
aspect of standing, by reason of which a person must prove the
defendant's conduct has damaged him in order to sue. 28 A drunk
person driving ninety miles an hour down a busy highway is not subject
to a lawsuit by a person unless he damages that person. Otherwise, any
witness could sue the driver, and it seems clear the matter is best left
to the police and criminal prosecution.

22. Id.
23. 243 Ga. App. 449, 530 S.E.2d 783 (2000).
24. Id. at 449-50, 530 S.E.2d at 784-85.
25. Id. at 453, 530 S.E.2d at 786.
26. Id. at 451-52, 530 S.E.2d at 786.
27. Id. at 452, 530 S.E.2d at 786.
28. See 13 Ga. Jur. Personal Injury and Torts § 21:20 (1995 & Supp. 1999), for a
discussion of the actual injury requirement for standing.
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In the case of a malpractice action against an attorney, however,
personal damage is not necessary to give the client standing, which
exists by virtue of the attorney-client relationship.29 Thus, in determining whether to file a malpractice action, lawyers should be careful to
distinguish proximate cause from standing. A client has standing to
bring a malpractice suit against his lawyer under the theory of
negligence by reason of the attorney-client relationship. However, there
is no reason to file the action if there is no proximate cause, that is, if
the client has suffered no harm due to the lawyer's actions. Moreover,
the absence of harm will usually be independent of the lawyer's alleged
negligence. Thus, while the lawyer's conduct may be negligent in the
abstract, courts deal with concrete, not theoretical, problems.
Related to the problem of standing in legal malpractice actions is the
requirement of an expert's affidavit under the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 9-11-9.1.3o Because a client or former
client automatically has standing by reason of the attorney-client
relationship, the expert affidavit is a standing hurdle, the purpose of
which is "to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice suits being
filed.""1
One may wonder why the protections against frivolous
lawsuits available to all defendants, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and its progeny in state courts, as well as the tort of abusive
litigation in Georgia, are not sufficient for lawyers, but that topic is for
another day.
Labovitz v. Hopkinson3 2 dealt with the scope of the expert affidavit
requirement. The defendant lawyers had represented plaintiff in a
divorce proceeding. Plaintiff, acting pro se, alleged that her attorneys
failed to obtain accurate information about her husband's income and
financial circumstances; represented to her that they had obtained such
information when they had not; failed to advise her of, or affirmatively
misrepresented to her about, her husband's income and finances; and
pressured her to accept a settlement below the amount to which she was
entitled. Plaintiff failed to file an expert affidavit, and after the period
for doing so expired, she amended her complaint to seek damages for
fraud and misrepresentation by defendants during the divorce proceedings. The trial court dismissed both the legal malpractice claim and the
amended complaint for failure to state an action. The court of appeals

29. See 14 Ga. Jur. PersonalInjury and Torts § 36:136 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
30. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2000).
31. Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 336, 519 S.E.2d 672, 678 (1999) (quoting
Housing Auth. of Savannah v. Greene, 259 Ga. 435, 439, 383 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1989))
(emphasis added).
32. 271 Ga. 330, 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999).
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affirmed the dismissal of the malpractice claim because of the lack of an
expert affidavit, but it reversed the dismissal of the amended complaint.33 The supreme court affirmed. 4
The issue before the supreme court was the effect of res judicata on a
nonmalpractice claim arising out of the same acts as a malpractice claim
that had been dismissed for failure to file an expert affidavit. 35 The
court ruled the failure to file an expert affidavit did not result in an
adjudication on the merits of the professional malpractice claim and
could not serve as a basis for dismissing the amended complaint. 36 The
court agreed with the reasoning of the court of appeals that O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1 applies only to:
that subset of professional malpractice actions which allege a negligent
act or omission or breach of contract for failure to perform professional
services in accordance with the professional obligation of care, and
appellee's allegations of fraud did not call into question the professional
standard of care applicable to attorneys since it is improper for anyone
to defraud another person.37
The general view seems to be that malpractice actions are negligence
actions, and the importance of Labovitz is that the Supreme Court of
Georgia specifically recognizes that professional malpractice encompasses more than negligence. The supreme court accepted the court of
appeals ruling on this point and its definition of "malpractice" adopted
from Webster's Third InternationalDictionary, noting that the court of
appeals had quoted it in two cases. 38 Thus, the supreme court defines
malpractice as:
"a dereliction from professional duty whether intentional, criminal, or
merely negligent by one rendering professional services that results in
injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those services or to those
entitled to rely upon them or that affects the public interest adversely;
the failure of one rendering professional services to exercise that
degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member
of the profession with the result of injury, loss, or damage to the
recipient of those services or to those entitled to rely upon them."39

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 330-31, 519 S.E.2d at 674.
Id. at 337, 519 S.E.2d at 678.
Id. at 331, 519 S.E.2d at 674.
Id. at 332-33, 519 S.E.2d at 675-76.
Id. at 333-34, 519 S.E.2d at 676.o
Id. at 335, 519 S.E.2d at 677.
Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1368 (1961)).
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The effect of Labovitz, arguably, is to say that the term "legal
malpractice" is no longer to be defined as a word of art, nor is it a term
meaning only negligence in the representation of a client. If so, Georgia
courts and lawyers may treat "malpractice" as a generic term, that is, a
term meaning bad practice in the representation of a client.
Davis v. Butle4 is interesting primarily for its facts. Plaintiff
lawyer sued his former client and his former client's lawyers for abusive
litigation because they sued him for malpractice. 4 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the former
client's lawyers on two grounds.42 First, plaintiff had not complied with
the condition under O.C.G.A. section 51-7-84(a) that a person give
written notice as a condition for filing an abusive litigation claim.43
Second, the trial court had denied the lawyer's motion for summary
judgment in the underlying action:"
Where the trial court finds in the alleged abusive litigation that such
action withstands the attack by motion for summary judgment and .is
entitled to a trial by jury, although the plaintiff may lose at trial, such
denial of summary judgment constitutes a legal determination that the
action has substantial justification, because it is not groundless or
frivolous and can proceed to jury trial.45
As for McDonnell, the former client, the court affirmed judgment for him
because of lack of service, failure by plaintiff lawyer to appear at the
default/no-service calendar, and want of prosecution.4 6
V.

FEES

The lawyer practices law as a licensee of the state not only to provide
legal services to clients, but also to earn a living. Unfortunately, selfinterest and the restrictions on nonlawyer practice provide an opportunity for abuse in charging fees. Presumably, for this reason, the rules of
ethics provide that a lawyer shall not charge an illegal or excessive fee,
the premise being that the lawyer is a fiduciary of the client and must
eschew the morals of the marketplace in making money.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

240 Ga. App. 72, 522 S.E.2d 548 (1999).
Id. at 72, 522 S.E.2d at 549.
Id. at 73-74, 522 S.E.2d at 549-50.
Id., 522 S.E.2d at 550.
Id.
Id. at 74, 522 S.E.2d at 550.
Id. at 75-76, 522 S.E.2d at 551-52.
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An example of fee abuse appears in In re Woodall,4" in which the
attorneys collected a $2.4 million fee for a $3,325,000 settlement of a
medical malpractice claim. Under the fee contract, they were entitled
to fifty percent of the recovery, but they increased that amount to
seventy-two percent by adding to the recovery the present value of
future medical services, for which the settlement agreement provided.
Moreover, they disbursed the fees to themselves without the approval of
the probate court, which had jurisdiction because the victim of the
malpractice action was incapacitated. The probate court ordered the
attorneys to pay their fees into the court registry and held them in
contempt for failure to do so.4"
The earlier court of appeals holding that the probate court lacked
jurisdiction to impose a finding of contempt 49 was reversed by the
Georgia Supreme Court. ° The supreme court reasoned that the
probate court's jurisdiction "'to approve the settlement ...and to protect
the best interest of the incapacitated ward [gave the court jurisdiction]
to require ...the attorneys'" to pay into court the settlement funds that
they disbursed to themselves without court approval.51 The court of
appeals grudgingly adopted the supreme court's holding, noting that the
court relied only on Ohio law, "which differs in many ways from our
own, in reversing our opinion. The implications of the Supreme Court's
ruling as to the application of Ohio law to enlarge the jurisdiction of
Georgia probate courts must await future clarification."52 Chief Judge
Johnson, with Judge Pope's concurrence, objected to this reasoning in a
special concurring opinion that was critical of the supreme court.53
The point the criticism overlooks is that courts, even probate courts,
have inherent power to do justice, and to tie the court's hands in this
type of situation certainly is to sanction an injustice. Surely, if a probate
court has the jurisdiction to approve a settlement, it has the power to
approve the disbursement of the funds and the jurisdiction to prevent
the funds from being disbursed without its approval.
In another fee case, Frame v.Booth, Wade & Campbell,54 the trial
court granted the law firm's motion for summary judgment on a
promissory note executed by a former client. The defense was economic

47. 241 Ga. App. 196, 526 S.E.2d 69 (1999).
48. Id. at 196-203, 526 S.E.2d at 71-74.
49. In re Woodall, 231 Ga. App. 391, 391, 499 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1998).
50. Gnann v. Woodall, 270 Ga. 516, 518, 511 S.E.2d 188, 190 (1999).
51. 241 Ga. App. at 196, 526 S.E.2d at 71 (quoting Gnann, 270 Ga. at 516, 511 S.E.2d
at 189).
52. Id. at 197, 526 S.E.2d at 71.
53. Id. at 203, 526 S.E.2d at 75-76 (Johnson, J., concurring specially).
54. 238 Ga. App. 428, 519 S.E.2d 237 (1999).
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duress. The client alleged that the law firm refused to forward his file
to his new counsel until he agreed to sign the note despite the approaching trial.55 The client relied on Standard 22(b) of the State Bar Rules,
which provides that "a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until
he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights
of his client, including ... delivering to the client all papers and
property to which the client is entitled."" The court reasoned this
Standard was not violated because under O.C.G.A. section 15-19-14(a),
the attorney can retain the client's papers until his fee is paid and the
client is not entitled to the papers until he pays the fee.57 There is no
indication the court considered Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-5, which
was issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia on September 26, 1988 and
provides in part that "an attorney's ethical obligation not to cause
prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien
statute. Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client
withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security
for unpaid fees."58
. The client also argued there was a jury issue as to the reasonableness
of the fees.59 The court said the reasonableness of the lawyer's fees was
not at issue "because this action was a suit on a note that included a
provision authorizing the 15 percent attorney fees permitted under
[O.C.G.A. section] 13-1-11(a)."6 °
In William J. Cooney, PC. v. Rowland,6 the court of appeals
confirmed its status as a friend of the lawyer. In an action to foreclose
an attorney's lien on settlement checks issued to the client, the trial
court, finding the fee agreement unconscionable, entered judgment for
Cooney for approximately one-third of the amount requested. 2 The
court of appeals disagreed and held the agreement should have been
enforced according to its terms, which included "interest [to] accrue on
any outstanding balances at the rate of one and one-half percent per
month beginning thirty days after the date the bill was presented and
continuing until paid."'

55. Id. at 428-30, 519 S.E.2d at 238-40.
56.

GA. CT. & BAR R. 4-102, STANDARD 22(b) (1983).

57. 238 Ga. App. at 430, 519 S.E.2d at 240 (citing O.C.G.A. § 15-19-4(a) (1999 & Supp.

2000)).
58. Op. State Disciplinary Bd. of the State of Ga. 87-5 (1988).
59. 238 Ga. App. at 432, 519 S.E.2d at 241.
60. Id.

61. 240 Ga. App. 703, 524 S.E.2d 730 (1999).
62. Id. at 703, 524 S.E.2d at 731-32.
63. Id., 524 S.E.2d at 732.
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The interesting point about the case is the court treated the attorneyfee contract as merely a commercial contract.6 4 The court said:
In addition to being authorized by the fee agreement to charge interest
at the rate charged, Cooney was authorized by statute to charge
interest in the manner in which it was charged. The owner of a
commercial account may charge interest on the balance due on the
account when the account has been due and payable thirty days or
more and may charge as much as one and one-half percent interest per
month on the balance ... ; an account is 'commercial" if it involves an
obligation to pay money arising out of a transaction to furnish services.
Furthermore, when a payment is made upon any debt, the creditor
shall apply the payment first to discharge the interest due, then to
reduce the principal .... At all times, Rowland could have avoided

any obligation to pay interest by paying the principal in full each
month as he agreed to do.65

The court of appeals also held the contract was not unconscionable.66
The court emphasized the freedom of parties to contract without having
courts save either side from a bad bargain and stated parties should be
permitted to enter into unreasonable contracts even if they lead to
hardship.6 7 The court summarily rejected the argument that the rules
of professional conduct govern attorney-fee contracts.6" The language
of the court speaks for itself. But there is a question: If an attorney-fee
contract is just another commercial contract, what happens to the rule
that a client, having signed a contract, can dismiss a lawyer at any time
for any reason or for no reason without penalty, and has
a duty to pay
69
fees only for the work done on quantum meruit basis?
One may also ask if eighteen percent interest on the unpaid balance
of attorney fees is against public policy. The question is relevant
because in Brandon v. Newman, ° the court of appeals considered State
Bar Standards 13 and 26.71 It concluded that "the State Bar disciplinary provisions establish the public policy disapproving rewards for
referrals through fee-sharing agreements with nonlawyers."
Thus,
the court relied on the Georgia Standards as establishing the public

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 704, 524 S.E.2d at 732.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 703, 524 S.E.2d at 732.
Id. at 705, 524 S.E.2d at 733.
Id. at 705-06, 524 S.E.2d at 733.
AFLAC v. Williams, 264 Ga. 351, 353, 314 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1994).
243 Ga. App. 183, 532 S.E.2d 743 (2000).
Id. at 187, 532 S.E.2d at 747.
Id.
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policy against fee splitting and voided an attorney's lien because the
lawyer had engaged in that practice.73
VI.

RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION

A.

Judges and Public Officials
Recusal, or disqualification of a judge, is a concept used to protect the
integrity of a trial. It is used when there is a factor present that will
bring the judge's impartiality into issue. It also provides criminal
defendants with a basis for overturning a conviction, as in Kelly v.
State."' In Kelly defendant alleged the trial judge should recuse
himself because the victim's husband was on the county commission,
which pays the supplemental salary of all judges in the circuit and
approximately half of the judges' operating budget. The judge denied
the motion for recusal. 7' The court of appeals affirmed. 6
Defendant's motion appeared to be soundly based in theory, but it was
not. To grant it, the court had to assume a judge would not be impartial
because the husband of the victim would demand vengeance and would
blame the judge if defendant were found not guilty. The motion was
based on the assumption that two public officials, the county commissioner and the judge, would breach their oaths of office for the purpose
of revenge. Moreover, the motion sought disqualification of all judges in
the circuit. The court of appeals was clearly correct in affirming the
denial of the motion.
A more interesting case on disqualification is Outdoor Advertising
Ass'n of Georgia v. Garden Club of Georgia,77 in which defendant moved
to disqualify former Attorney General Michael Bowers from representing
the Garden Club because the Attorney General's Office had represented
the Department of Transportation and issued opinions in related matters
during Mr. Bowers' tenure. 78 The supreme court determined Mr.
Bowers had not been personally involved in transactions relating to the
issues in the case, which had been handled by his staff, and affirmed the
trial court's denial of the motion to disqualify.79 Had Mr. Bowers been
personally involved in handling the matter as attorney general,
presumably the result would have been different. The court, by
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implication, made a useful distinction between official and personal
conduct for dealing with the disqualification of former public officials.
The distinction is that official conduct is pro forma, whereas personal
conduct involves actual knowledge. Thus, the court was unwilling to
penalize former public officials when the basis for disqualification of
lawyers in the private sector-the possible misuse of client information-is not present. 80
B.

PrivateAttorneys
Disqualification is a conflict of interest by reason of status. Thus, a
judge or other public official is disqualified for lack of impartiality. The
private lawyer is disqualified for conflict of interest, which means the
presence of a factor that prevents the lawyer from exercising independent professional judgment on behalf of a client. During the survey
period, six cases-all criminal cases-involved conflicts of interest.
In Gray v. State,8 defendants alleged that "their trial lawyers had
a conflict of interest and were ineffective per se" because both were
public defenders from the Same office. 2 The court rejected the
claim.83 Only counsel with an actual conflict that adversely affects his
performance is ineffective.8 4 Because defendants relied solely on their
per se argument, they did not show an actual conflict or ineffectiveness
of counsel.8"
In Abney v. State,86 defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
because his court-appointed attorney was married to a prosecutor who
had prosecuted defendant in an unrelated case. The trial lawyer
testified there was no involvement in, nor discussion of, the case with his
wife. 7 To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
because of a conflict of interest, a defendant must prove an actual
conflict that adversely affected the counsel's performance.88
To the same effect is Jones v.State,89 in which the conflict was
alleged to be the lawyer's representation of defendant and his brother.
The brother was willing to testify the methamphetamine drugs found in
defendant's garage were his. The lawyer declined to use the brother's
80. Id. at 150, 527 S.E.2d at 861.
81. 240 Ga. App. 716, 523 S.E.2d 626 (1999).
82. Id. at 718, 523 S.E.2d at 629.
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testimony, and defendant contended the refusal resulted from the active
representation of the brother.90 The court tersely noted that "ineffective assistance of counsel does not result from the refusal of counsel to
use possibly perjured testimony."
In Williams v. State,92 defendant alleged a conflict of interest by his
lawyer because the lawyer had formerly represented the confidential
informant and had animosity toward him that precluded the lawyer from
calling the informant as a witness.9" The court determined there was
animosity, but the failure to call the informant was a decision of trial
strategy because the lawyer viewed the informant as an unpredictable
witness who might harm defendant's case.94
The Georgia Supreme Court dealt with the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel because of a conflict of interest in two felonymurder cases, but the claim was rejected in both instances. In Wilson
v. State,95 defendant claimed error because counsel's wife worked for
the Department of Corrections, and casually knew the victim and people
acquainted with the victim.9 6 The court considered the relationship to
be both minimal and indirect and concluded there was no evidence it
affected counsel's performance.9" In Lyons v. State,98 two attorneys
appointed to represent defendant withdrew when the district attorney
hired them. The attorneys had represented defendant for only a few
months; neither had improper communications about the case while
employed by the district attorney; and defendant continued to be
represented by the same lead counsel. 9 Based on these facts, the court
rejected the claim. 100
VII.

DISCIPLINARY MATTERS

In In re Gaff,' a. lawyer was suspended for one year because he
hired a disbarred lawyer and allowed him to have contact with the office
clients in violation of Standard 73.1"2 Standard 73 provides:
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A lawyer shall not allow a person who has been suspended or disbarred
and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice of law is
conducted by the lawyer, to represent himself or herself as a lawyer,
or to have contact with persons who have legal
0 3dealings with the office
either in person, by telephone, or in writing.
Defendant had a law office in Canton, Georgia, and opened another law
office in Fitzgerald, Georgia, and he hired a disbarred lawyer to work as
a paralegal.' °4 The court found that "although [Gaff] received a
warning from the State Bar about potential violations of Standard 73,"
he allowed the disbarred lawyer to work in his office unsupervised. °5
In In re Henley, °6 the lawyer was disbarred for representing persons
falsely claiming to have been in automobile accidents and who were
seeking insurance payments for nonexistent personal injuries and
property damage.0 7 Henley contended the Bar had "improperly used
the documents subpoenaed to expand the scope of the investigation
against him" and thereby violated his constitutional rights.0 8 The
court concluded that inasmuch' as the documents were subpoenaed
during the investigative phase and prior to the filing of formal charges,
"the full protection of constitutional due process did not attach." 0 9
Because Henley was given ample notice and opportunity to present his
defense, no new charges were added after the filing of the formal
complaint.O10

In re D.KM."' was an appeal from a denial for certification of
fitness to practice law. The certification had been granted, but it was
suspended when the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants
received a letter from an administrative law judge who had presided
over D.K.M.'s pro se workers' compensation case. 12 The court affirmed
the Board's denial of certification, stating that "[als properly characterized by the hearing officer, [D.K.M.'s] conduct throughout his workers'
compensation case constituted an abuse of the legal process and his
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filing of admittedly frivolous complaints showed a complete lack of both
personal and professional integrity."1 '
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The occurrences and cases during the survey period reveal vision,
conflict, resolve, and resolution. The adoption by the supreme court of
the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct coupled with the release of
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers shows a shift from the
narrow concept of "legal ethics" to the more inclusive concept of "lawyer's
law." Consistent with this adjustment is the expanded use of the term
"malpractice" as seen in Labovitz."4 This vision of the realities of the
21st century should help the profession as it seeks its proper place in
today's community.
There are, however, always a few bumps in the road. These obstacles
are to be expected as the profession seeks to modernize itself. Thus, the
application of the concept that the lawyer's duties are derivative of the
client's duties is accepted in the Restatement, rejected in Bowen, and
applied in Georgia Receivables, Inc."5 Inconsistency is also revealed
as the courts in Frame and Brandon considered the unsettled question
16
of whether disciplinary rules constitute statements of public policy.'
One group, of cases reveals the resolve of the courts to exercise
authority over the practice. Woodall is an example of the supreme
court's upholding of the authority of the probate courts over the actions
of attorneys practicing' in that court. 117
Another example is the
position taken by the
court
on
an
issue
of
personal
and professional
8
integrity in D.M.K.11
The period produced the resolution of several important issues. The
courts took what might be considered a strict construction position in
several disqualification and conflicts of interest cases. Disqualification
of present and former public officials must be based on more than
speculation, as shown by Kelly and Outdoor Advertising Ass'n of
Georgia."9 Conflicts of interest must be based on an actual conflict
that renders counsel ineffective, as shown in Gray, Abney, Jones,
Williams, and Lyons. 2 ' In Gaff the court considered the issue of
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constitutional due process and concluded that in disciplinary cases it
does not fully attach until after the filing of formal charges. 2 ' In
Henley it considered the application of the no contact rule as applied to
disbarred or suspended lawyers. 2'
It was a busy time for the courts, and with the advent of the new
rules, the next survery period should be even busier. This activity is,
however, as it should be because "lawyer's law" is no more static than
any other part of our discipline.
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